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MEASURJNG THE SOCIAL COSTS AND 
BENEFITS AND IDENTIFYING THE VICTIMS 
OF SUBORDINATING SECURJTY INTERESTS 
IN BANKRUPTCY 
Steven L. Harris & Charles W Mooney, jr.t 
I NTRO DUCTION 
In recent years, some legal scholars have questioned the utility 
and fa irness of security interests and the favorable trea tment afforded 
security interests in bankruptcy. More recently, a few have made con-
crete proposals for subordinating securi ty interests to tort and other 
claims in bankruptcy. Unlike m any earlier theore tical explorations of 
secured debt, the subordina tion proposals acknowledge that evaluat-
ing the effects of affording priority to secured claims in bankruptcy 
turns on the answers to a number of difficult empirical questions. As 
of yet, however, none of the subordination proponents has addressed 
these ques tions in any detail. 
In this Article, we suggest several approach es for quantifying the 
major social costs and ben efits likely to result from adoption of a sub-
ordination proposal. In particular, we focus on the costs of contrac-
tions in the amount of credit that would be extended if a 
subordina tion proposal were enacted into law. We also consider 
claims tha t affording priority to secured claims in bankruptcy pro-
motes ineffici ent, less prudent conduct. 
I 
THE S u BO RDINATI ON PROPOSALS 
Since 1994, no one h as seriously question ed tha t at least some 
secured transactions provide b enefits that offse t any costs imposed on 
a debtor 's unsecured creditors. 1 One finds evidence of this recogni-
t The authors are, respec tively, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and 
Professor of Law, U niversity of Pennsylvania Law School. Th ey serve as Reporters fo r the 
Draftin g Committee to Revise U niform Comme rcial Code Arti cle 9. The views expressed 
in this Article are not n ecessarily those of th e Drafting Commi ttee o r il<> sponsors-the 
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commission ers on Unifo rm State 
Laws. Th e authors thank David Carlson, Ri cha rd Hasen , Richard McAdams, Randal 
Picker, Eric Posner, and Paul Shupack for their helpful comme nl<;. 
l Paul Shupack should be credited 'vith an early explanation of this insigh t. Paul M. 
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured T ransactions, 41 RuTGERS L. REv. 1067, 1093-11 21 
(1989) . 
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tion in at least three of the articles that appeared in a symposium issue 
of the Virginia Law Review in 1994.2 One benefit probably is the most 
obvious: security can facilitate extensions of credit that creditors 
othenvise would not make, and debtors can use the credit extended to 
create wealth. Stated othenvise, the institution of secured credit is not 
necessarily harmful to unsecured creditors as a class. For example, se-
cured credit that enables a debtor to pay unsecured creditors for 
goods and services or that reduces a debtor's risk of insolvency can 
benefit those creditors. Consider, as well, that those business debtors 
that become insolvent while leaving material debts unpaid are, we sus-
pect, a distinct minority. The net effect of secured credit on un-
secured creditors is an empirical Issue that remains to be 
demonstrated conclusively. 3 
2 David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REv. 2179, 2181-98 
( 1994); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr. , A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: 
Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2025-47 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki , The 
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1892-1923 (1994). Volume 80:8 of the 
Virginia Law Re-view, in which these articles appear, contains the papers and commentary 
delivered at a 1993 conference in Charlottesville commemorating the commencement of 
the project to revise UCC Article 9. 
3 In their recent article, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fri ed acknowledge the central 
role of empirical questions concerning the costs and benefits of secured credit. Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 
105 YALE L.J. 857, 91 3-29 (1996). In our article, we explained: 
In the absence of empirical data it is ... impossible to conclude 
whether giving security generally transfers wealth from unsecured creditors to 
secured c reditors. Research that focuses only on creditors of debtors that 
actually become insolvent cannot possibly answer the question; everyone 
knows tha t collateral provides a comparative advantage to the secured cred-
itor in that situation. 
Harris & Mooney, sujJTa note 2, at 2036 (emphasis added). In his recent study, Steven 
Schwarcz refined our point in arguing that secured credit often is beneficial to unsecured 
crecli tors: 
This Article ... adopts a new term, "class Pare to e ff1ciency," re fle c ting 
that the proper unit of analysis is the class and not the individual. A trans-
action is class Pare to efficient if it is Pareto efficient when viewing each class 
of persons affected by th e class of transactions as a single collective per-
son. . . . Class Pareto efficie ncy is th erefore a useful way of assessing the 
policy impact of an action on affected groups, such as the policy impact of 
secured credit on unsecured creditors. 
New money secured credit appears to be class Pareto efficient, and 
therefore efficient from a policy standpoint .... Unsecured creditors as a 
class [are) be tter off because the availability of secured credit increases 
debtor liquidity and therefore increases the expec ted value of unsecured 
claims. 
Steven L. Scbwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankrup!L}, 47 DuKE L.J. 
(forthcoming Dec . 1997) Uuly 3, 1997 manuscript at 62-63, on file with authors); see also 
Ronald J. Mann , The Role of SRcured Credit in Small B11siness Lending, 86 CEo. LJ. (forthcom-
ing 1997) (Feb. 24, 1997 manuscript at 45-47, on file with authors) (expressing doubt that 
secured financing is materially adverse to the interests of unsecured creditors). 
rm;· · 
• 
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This Part offers a brief overview of three articles that argue m 
favor of subordinating secured claims to tort claims and certain other 
claims. 
In his 1991 article, David Leebron explored proposals to elimi-
nate limited liability for corporate shareholders.4 The kernel of his 
analysis recognized that limited liability permits corporations to exter-
nalize risk, with the result that corporations engage in behavior that is 
inefficient-i.e., too risky. 5 Tort victims bear the risk and costs of this 
n egative externality. 6 Leebron also pointed out that the same result 
occurs by virtue of the treatment of d ebt in insolvency proceedings, 
inasmuch as unsecured debt receives pari passu treatment with tort 
claims. 7 And, h e explained, the priority afforded to secured claims 
exacerbates the problem.8 Consequently, h e called for the subordina-
tion of both secured and unsecured claims to tort claims on efficiency 
grounds. 9 
There are both useful insights in and powerful arguments against 
Leebron's proposal. For present purposes, however, two points are 
sufficient. First, Leebron's proposal is designed to provide incentives 
that will induce optimal (efficient) risk and care on the part of com-
mercial actors. It is not his purpose either to increase compensation 
to tort victims or to m aximize recoveries by other unsecured creditors. 
Although Leebron's conclusions have been cited by those who find 
fault with the existing secured-credit regime on distributional 
grounds, to Leebron's normative principle is efficien cy, not "fairness" 
or "distributive justice." Second, Leebron d oes not appear to take se-
riously the possibility that unsecured creditors might benefi t from af-
fording priority to secured claims. 11 
4 David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, T mt Victims, and C1editms, 91 Cou; M. L. REv. 
1565 ( 1991) (suggesting, but ultimately rt>jecting, the idea) . 
'> Id. at 1570-74. 
6 See id. a t 1574, 1600-05. 
7 !d. at 1637-40. 
8 ld. at 1646-49. 
9 Id. at 1650 . Leebron was not the first to suggest this possibility. See H enry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Towa·rd Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Cmpomle Tmts, 
l OO YALE LJ. 1879, 1902 & n.66 (1991) (suggesting, bu t ultimately rej ecting, the idea). 
l O See LoPucki , sujJra note 2, at 1888-89 ("The ins titution of securi ty has a ... bad 
rep utation. Its most persistent image is that of fam ilies forc ed from home or farm th rough 
foreclosu re. Most noneconomists wish tha t things could be different. v\'e are rooting for 
the underdog, which means we are rooting against securi ty. ") (footnote omi tted). 
1 l On e might think that so long as the security granted does not exceed the 
value transfe rred to the d ebtor, the tort victim does not lose , and indeed 
might gain. But as Alan Schwartz has d emonstrated , this proposition is d u-
bious and d epends on the unrealistic assumption that th e funds will be in-
vested in a project that is risk free or yields re turns that are negatively 
corre la ted with the other businesses of the borrower. 
Leebron, supra n ote 4, at 1646-47 (citing Alan Schwartz, A Theo1y of Loan Priorities, 18 .J. 
LEGAL STUD. 209, 228-34 (1989)). As David Carlson h as pointed o ut, Schwartz's model 
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In his Virginia Law Review article, Lynn LoPucki built on Leeb-
ron's analysis in urging the subordination of security interests to tort 
creditors in bankruptcy. 1 2 Like Leebron, LoPucki grounded his pro-
posal largely on the argument that forcing debtors to internalize the 
costs of injury to others will induce debtors to reduce the amount of 
tortious injury they cause. 13 He argued that affording priority to tort 
and surprised, consensual, unsecured creditors would cause secured 
creditors to monitor debtors in a way that would make debtors behave 
more carefully and therefore commit fewer torts. 14 LoPucki also sug-
gested, as did Leebron, that current law, which affords security inter-
ests priority over tort claims, permits the debtor to externalize its 
costs. 15 As the proportion of a firm's assets provided by debt in-
creases, the proportion invested by the shareholders decreases, 
thereby reducing the shareholders' risk and placing the risks on credi-
tors. By enabling secured creditors to receive the firm's assets ahead 
of tort creditors, current law eliminates any incentive for secured cred-
itors to monitor the safety of the debtor's operations and products. 
This, the argument goes, results in less care and more torts. 16 
Although Leebron explained that the pari passu treatment of consen-
sual unsecured creditors and tort claims has the same, but less pro-
nounced effects, 17 LoPucki did not advocate subordination of all 
contractual, nontort claims to tort claims. 
Unlike Leebron, LoPucki confronted countervailing considera-
tions, including the proposed system's impact on the cost and availa-
bility of credit. 18 But LoPucki resolved the empirical problem to his 
satisfaction by imagining a market-based solution: tort priority insur-
ance- a product that insurers would develop and offer in response to 
demands from secured parties wishing to insure themselves against 
loss of their collateral to tort claimants. 19 
always assumes tha t the proceeds of secured loa ns immediate ly disappear. David Gray Carl-
son, Secured Lending as a Zero Sum Game 21 -22 (1997) (unpublished m a nuscript, on fil e 
with authors). 
12 LoPucki , supra no te 2, a t 1908-14. LoPucki a lso urged subordination of security 
inte rests to certain unsecured claims h e ld by consensual, nontort creditors. !d. at 1947-63. 
Asse rting tha t th e risks imposed by the ir debto rs ' secured d ebt unfa irly surprise a material 
po rtion of consensual creditors, he proposed to subordinate securi ty interes ts to th e claims 
of eve ry unsecured conse nsual creditor unless 1) the secured party actually brought the 
existence of the security interest to th e a ttentio n of the prospec tive unsecured creditor, or 
2) the un securecl credi to r reaso nably should have expected the existence of the security 
inte rest. !d. LoPucki's empirical assumption about th e widespread surprise of unsecured 
creditors seems implausible, at best. 
1?. !d. a t 1897-99. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1 8 
19 
!d. a t 1911-14. 
!d. 
See id. 
Leebron , supra no te 4, a t 1639-40. 
LoPucki, sujJra note 2, a t 1911-12. 
!d. a t 191 2-13. 
·.~ 
I 
.j 
I 
! 
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In their recent article in the Yale Law journal, Lucian Bebchuk 
and Jesse Fried have attempted a more complete analysis of the effects 
oflegal rules governing priority, which generally afford secured credi-
tors priority over tort creditors a1\d other "nonadjusting" creditors, 20 
and the potential effects of subordinating security interests to tort and 
other nonadjusting creditors' claims. They offer alternative proposals. 
One would subordinate security interests generally and fully to all 
nonadjusting claims in bankruptcy. 21 The other would treat a fixed, 
statutorily imposed fraction (their example is 25 % ) of the secured 
claim as an unsecured claim in bankruptcy.22 
Bebchuk and Fried, like Leebron and LoPucki before them, base 
their arguments on efficiency. 23 Like LoPucki, and in contrast to 
Leebron, Bebchuk and Fried pay attention to positive as well as nega-
tive externalities.24 They identify externalities heretofore overlooked 
or given little acknowledgment. 25 However, we question their conclu-
sions and empirical assumptions, especially those concerning eco-
nomic benefits of credit that would be extended under current law 
but that would not be extended were one of their proposals adopted. 
Two recent works in progress offer critiques of the Bebchuk and 
Fried article. Steven Schwarcz develops arguments that we had previ-
ously m ade in the Virginia Law Review to the effect tha t secured credit 
20 By "nonadjusting" creditors, the authors m ea n creditors tha t are unable, or that 
rationally d ecline, to adjust the amo unt of credit they extend or the amount th ey charge 
for credit to take into account risks imposed by the crea tion of security interests in favor of 
other credito rs. The category of "no nadjusting" credito rs includes suppliers whose claims 
are too small to warrant making adjustments and governmental enti ties holding claims for 
taxes. Bebchuk & Fried , supra note 3, at 864-65. 
:! l See id. at 905-09. 
:!2 See id. at 909-11. They apptd. r to favor the fixed-fraction approach. !d. a t 910-11 
("Although a rule such as the 75 % f1x ed-fraction rul e would reduce but not e limina te the 
inefficiencies identified in this Article, it might b e prefe rable to th e adjustable-prio rity rule 
because it would create less uncertain ty fo r secured creditors and would be som ewhat eas-
ier to administer."). The terms "secured claim" and "unsecured claim" have th e m eaning 
ascribed to them in the Bankruptcy Code. See id. a t 859 n.J (c iting ll U.S. C. § 506(a) 
(1994)) . Thus, an oversecured creditor-one whose co lla teral h as a value in excess of the 
amount of its claim-holds a secured claim equal to the amount of the claim , wh ereas an 
undersecured creditor-one whose claim exceeds the value of its collateral-ho lds a se-
cured cl aim equal to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the balance. 
:!3 H aving identified the effici ency costs assoc ia ted with full prio rity, we a lso 
have considered the desirabili ty of a differe nt approach-according o nly 
partial priority to secured cla ims. Our analysis of partial prio ri ty has shown 
tha t such a rul e could eliminate o r reduce th ese efficiency cos ts-and th a t 
su ch an approach may well be mo re efficient than the full-p1·iority rul e . 
!d. at 934. 
24 !d. a t 913-21 (discussing nega tive externali ties of partial pri o ri ty, i.e. , pos itive exter-
nalities of full priority, including increased informa ti on acquisitio n costs, increased cost of 
coordina ti ng monitoring efforts , and reduced fin ancing for d es irable activities) . 
25 !d. a t 895-903 (discussing in efficient securi ty interests, disto rted choices be tween 
security and covenants, distorted inves tment and precaution decisions, suboptimal use of 
covenants, and suboptimal enforce rnen t efforts). 
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can facilitate credit that otherwise would not be extended and that 
this credit can create wealth and reduce the likelihood of default. 26 
He goes on to explain why firms may be reluctant to give security and 
how secured credit can provide needed liquidity for troubled but via-
ble firms that are unable to borrow on an unsecured basis. '2 7 He also 
explains in detail how granting full priority to secured credit can in-
crease the expected value of unsecured claims. 28 David Carlson also 
criticizes Bebchuk and Fried's conclusions and methodology.29 He 
points out that, notwithstanding their more detailed explanations, 
Bebchuk and Fried actually add little to the d ebate on secured 
credit. 3° Carlson argues that, by positing secured credit as a zero-sum 
game and by conflating wealth transfers with social gains and losses, 
Bebchuk and Fried make the same mistakes as several earlier 
authors.3 1 
This brief overview suggests some important implications for 
scholarship and law-reform agendas alike. First, the subordination 
proposals are based on efficiency grounds. Others may make a nor-
mative claim that it simply is "unfair" to elevate secured claims over 
those of tort claimants and other nonadjusting creditors, even if the 
subordination of security interests were inefficient and would reduce aggTegate 
wealth. But that normative claim will dra1-v no support from these 
proposals. 
'2.6 Schwarcz , supra n o te 3 (manuscript at 18-21 ) . 
'2.7 !d. (m anuscript at 22-26). Of course , as we stressed in our a rticle, p rovid ing liquid-
ity for troubled firms is only one illustra tion of the contexts in which credit wo uld be 
available o nly on a secured basis and can be used to create weal th. Harris & Mo oney, supra 
no te 2, a t 2025-45. 
'2.0 Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 43-58). 
Carlson, sujJra note 11 (manuscript at 57-79). 
!d. (manuscript at 58, 79). 
Bebchuk and Fried claim to have d em onstrated th a t some security inte rest~ 
are effi cient and som e are not. They make no a ttempt to quan tify whether 
th e effici ent securi ty interests predomi:1.ate, or whe th e r the inefficie nt o nes 
predomin ate. Indeed, at o ne point they suggest that not even fi rms who 
issue sectHity interest~ ... know wheth e r security in terests will affect th e 
m arke t value of th eir own asse t5. Given such a lack o f knowledge , th e re is 
no sense in trying to make policy on the basis of wealth maximization . To 
do so wo uld be irrespo nsible and unsc ien tifi c . . 
Neverth e less , in spite of their lack of theo re ti cal g rounding, Bebchuk 
and Fried do not hesita te to offer two policy suggestion s. First, they suggest 
tha t sec ured cla ims b e subordinated o nly to th ose credito rs wh o have be en 
exposed to uncompensated risk. Second , they sugges t that all secured 
cla ims be taxed by 25% in bankruptcy proceedings in order to make se-
cured credit more risky. 
In effe ct, Bebchuk and Fried started to build an im·estrnent m odel. In 
th e middl e of doing so, they forgot the ir premises and re\'e rted back to th e 
zero sum base line, in which all investments ha\'e already taken place. This 
unacknowledged shift to premises compl e tely inYalida tes their findin gs. 
Id. (m an uscript a t 69-70, 78). 
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Second, these proposals suggest a rich field in which legal schol-
_.,, ars may join hands with those in other disciplines to study credit. 
Testing more fully the empirical assumptions and hypotheses that un-
derlie these and other proposals will be difficult, but may be both re-
warding and surprising. It will require more serious consideration of 
the direct and indirect economic effects of extensions of credit that 
solvent and insolvent debtors in fact repay. And it will require study of 
those insolvent debtors that resolve their financial affairs outside of 
bankruptcy. 
As long as bankruptcy debtors are a small minority not only of all 
debtors but of insolvent debtors as well, narrowly focusing only on 
bankruptcy debtors will teach little about the full effects of secured 
credit. Bankruptcy rules have consequences outside bankruptcy, espe-
cially in the process of credit extension. No one could believe that 
everything in the credit markets would remain constant under subor-
dination rules except that secured creditors would hand over money to 
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, we are 
wary of assertions that professional secured creditors oppose the sub-
ordination pr0?osals because the proposals' adoption would take 
wealth from them and give it to unsecured creditors. Imposition of a 
subordination regime may, in fact, increase the aggregate losses that 
secured creditors suffer in insolvency proceedings. But secured credi-
tors are likely to react to subordination rules by taking the new rules 
into account when assessing their risks and making business decisions. 
Once the dust settles, :>ecured creditors may find that their returns 
have not been adversely affected. 
There is one way, of course, that some secured creditors could 
lose under the subordination proposals. Secured creditors that can 
exploit a market position to extend secured credit profitably under 
current law might lose profits under a regime that would materially 
contract their extensions of credit. Their alternative sources of invest-
ment may be less profitable. However, the bigger losers would be 
those debtors that would receive less funding and those others that 
would, consequently, be prevented fro m entering into transactions 
with those debtors. If this account is accurate, th en those who view 
curren t law as "pro-secured creditor" necessarily must view current law 
as even more "pro-debtor."~>:-2 
3:-2 See, e.g., Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter, An notated Project Outline, Proposed 
Convention on Security Interests in, and Transfers and Leasing of, Aviation Mobile Equip-
ment: Economic Im pact Assessment 30-33 Unne 25, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on 
fil e with authors ) (estimating, based on stock marl..et claw, that recent clarifica tions to 
Bankruptcy Code § lllO, which affords certain financers and lesso rs of transportation 
equipment enhanced rights to be paid currently or to take possession of the equipment, 
increased the capitalized future earnings for the four airlines included in the Standard & 
Poor's airline index (i.e., debtors and lessees) by $442 .8 million , or 4.65% of the previous 
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II 
EsTIMATIN G THE Soc iAL CosTs OF THE SuBORDINATION 
PROPOSALS 
In this Part we consider how two significant effects of the subordi-
nation proposals might be quantified. We suggest a research agenda, 
not definitive conclusions. We first consider the costs of contractions 
of credit extensions, including the costs imposed on debtors' un-
secured creditors, that would result from adopting the subordination 
proposals as measured against the resulting benefits for unsecured 
creditors (i.e., larger distributions). Second, we consider the argu-
ment that subordinating secured claims would reduce a negative ex-
ternality that current law creates-the inducement of debtors to 
externalize risk, resulting in more risky behavior. 
A. Costs of Credit Contractions and Benefits of Increased 
Distributions 
Our article in the Virginia Law Review explains how secured credit 
may benefit unsecured creditors generally, although it has the effect 
of subordinating unsecured claims against debtors that enter bank-
ruptcy. 33 One major benefit is the facilitation of credit that creditors 
otherwise would not extend. We hypothesize that adopting the subor-
dination proposals would materially reduce credit available to dis-
tressed businesses, and that the costs of the credit contraction would 
swamp the benefits of increased distributions in bankruptcy for the 
promoted classes of creditors. 34 
In his work in progress, Steven Schwarcz explains why credit 
might be available to an insolvent debtor only on a secured basis and 
equity value of the airlines). These authors also o bse rved: "It should be noted tha t the 
upgrade of airline d ebt and its comm ensurate reduction in financing costs attributable to 
the proposed Convention fo r non-U .S. a irlines is likely to be significantly grea te r than the 
upgrade attr ibutable to th e Bankruptcy Refo rm Act's clarification of Section 1110 in the 
United States. " ld. (manuscript at 33). T he Conventio n to which the authors refe r is the 
Draft Convention on Internatio nal Interes ts in Mobile Equipment, which would cover se-
curity interests in and leases of high-value m obile equipment such as a ircraft, railroad roll-
ing stock, sa tellites, and ships. The Inte rnatio nal Institute for the U nifi ca tion of Private 
Law, in Rom e, sponsors work o n the Convention . 
33 In b rief, our Vilginia Law Review articl e explains that d ebtors m ay h ave access to 
mo re credit under the existing legal regime , wh ich validates secured transactions, than 
they would if all credit were unsecured. vVe argue tha t the addi tiona l credit m ay increase 
the expected va lue of unsecured claims by, in ter alia, reducing th e probability of the 
d ebtor's default, providing a source o f repayment to unsecured credito rs, and e nabling the 
debtor to remain in business and conclude future transactions. Harris & Mooney, supra 
no te 2. 
3 4 It is implausible to assume tha t risk-ne utral lenders would be willing to exte nd the 
same amount of credit, but with an in creased ri sk p remium. As Paul Shupack has ex-
plained, "[a] t some level of risk, the model [of secured lending] mus t allow othe rwise risk-
neutral creditors to cease le nding." Shu pack, sujJra note 1, a t 1097. 
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how 2. subordination regime "would create an economic disincentive 
that would cause many potential lenders simply to refuse to make 
loans to debtors."35 Contractions in available credit might also come 
in the form of loans made in a smaller amount. The conventional 
wisdom in the credit markets supports our hypothesis that the con-
traction of credit is likely to be material, inasmuch as subordination of 
a security interest would diminish the collateral value on which a se-
cured lender could rely. 36 
Estimating the aggregate costs of credit contraction that one could ex-
pect from adopting the subordination proposals would require an ini-
tial estimate of the aggregate amount of credit contraction. Upon settling 
on an estimate of the latter sum, it would then be possible to estimate, 
by using a multiplier based on a variety of economic assumptions,37 
the aggregate costs. These costs then could be compared with the 
aggregate amount of increased distributions in insolvency proceedings (or 
otherwise) that would flow from adoption of the subordination pro-
posals.38 In each case, assumptions as to the precise subordination 
formula-e.g., subordinate secured claims to tort claims, subordinate 
secured claims to the claims of nonadjusting creditors, or treat 25% of 
the secured claim as unsecured-would influence the estimates. In 
reality, we doubt that anyone could generate a meaningful estimate of 
the actual amounts of these costs and benefits for the entire United 
States (or any other) economy. For example, even with complete and 
accurate data on distributions in bankruptcy, how would one accu-
rately take into account costs arising out of informal negotiations in 
the shadow of bankruptcy priority rules? Although developing a 
35 See Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 36). 
% See, e.g., Joe Rizzi, Gauging Debt Capacity, CoRP. C.'>.SHFLOW, Feb. 1994, at 33, 34 ("A'i-
set-based lending can increase the debt capacity of middle-market or non investment-grade 
firms with strong tangible asset bases but low or volatile cash flow streams. Standard ad-
vance rates against eligible accounts receivable, inventory and net property, plant and 
equipment are 80%, 50% and 40%, respectively."); see aLm Jim Embree, Commercial Loan 
Risk Ratings for Collateral and Control, Bus. CREDIT, July-Aug. 1995, at 12 (explaining how 
collateral is rated accm·ding to its liquidity, marketability, and value, and how the rating 
affects the availability of credit). Some disagree with the conventional wisdom. See Ronald 
J. Mann, Strate,!,ry and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MicH. L. REv. (forthcoming 
Nov. 1997) (Apr. 29, 1997 manuscript at 81-82, on file with authors) (reponing that 1) an 
insurance company executive was not confident that adoption of a fixed-fraction subordi-
nation proposal applicable both in and out of bankruptcy would have a significant long-
term effect on the amount of credit extended, and 2) a banking executive predicted that 
adoption would have no effect whatsoever on bank lending). 
37 One might assume, for example, that the supply of credit is sufficient to provide an 
appropriate amount of credit to creditworthy borrowers. 
38 As with an estimate of wealth losses arising out of contractions of credit, an esti-
mate of wealth gains from increased distributions in insolvency proceedings would require 
assumptions concerning the uses to which the distributions would be put. ·wealth transfers 
alone do not represent wealth increases and do not have any necessary efficiency 
implications. 
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meaningful estimate of aggregate amounts may not be possible, esti-
mating the relative amounts of the costs of credit contraction and ben-
efits of increased distributions in identified samples may be. There 
are several plausible approaches.39 
Initially, it will be necessary to identify market segments in which 
anecdotal evidence and common knowledge indicate that secured 
credit plays an important role. Examples are the markets for financ-
ing agricultural production, the acquisition of commercial aircraft 
and other equipment, credit secured by financial assets such as securi-
ties (at both the wholesale and retail levels), securitization transac-
tions, and credit for small commercial, retail, and industrial 
businesses. The next step will be to identify a manageable sample. 
Possibilities abound. Some industries may collect data concerning 
their members that is available for the asking. One also could use 
questionnaires and interviews to survey relevant samples of market 
participants. Analyses of the records of a sample of lenders with large 
and diverse portfolios also might be useful. Those records and portfo-
lios also would support the study and analysis of data concerning the 
borrowers who do not default, recoveries from those who do d efault, 
the incidence of default, denials of credit, lending policies involving 
loan-to-collateral ratios, results of nonbankruptcy workouts, and the 
like .40 
Another approach would draw from available data to create man-
ageable predictions .4 1 For example, assume one identifies a market 
segment with 1000 firms, each holding assets valued at $125,000 and 
!19 Among the approaches we do not explore is to compare data from an economy 
with a functional personal property security regime to data from an economy without on e. 
For example , recent 'tudies by the World Bank predict that Bolivia's adoption of an effec-
tive personal prop erty security law would cause interest rates to d ecrease and credit availa-
bili ty to increase, th e reby resulting in a social gain equal to as much as two p e rcent of the 
Bolivian gross domes tic product. See Heywood W. Flei sig et al., Legal Restrictions on Security 
Interests Limit Access to Credit in Bolivia, 31 INT'L LAw. 65, 70 ( 1997); see also Saunders & 
Walter, sujJm note 32 (manuscript at 33) (discussing the favorable economic impact on 
n on-Uni ted States airlines that would result from improving the effec tiveness of personal 
property security laws). 
40 In his recent study of 74 problem loans origina ted by three lende rs, Ronald Mann 
suggest-> that, "[g) ive n the relative infreque ncy o f bankruptcy and liquidation even in the 
universe of distressed loans," the changes that would result from adoption of the subordi-
nation proposals "do not seem se rious enough to h ave serious effect'i in the massive uni-
ve rse of cases in the market for loan origination. " Mann, suj;ra n ote 36 (manuscript a t 80). 
Give n the diversity of lenders and credit marke ts, the possibility that a subordination re-
gime might not materially affe ct the extension of credit by some flnance rs in some marke t<; 
is in no way inconsistent with the possibility that such a regim e wou ld m ateria lly affect 
existing or future flnancings by the same finance rs in other markets or by those or oth e r 
fin ancers in other marke ts. 
4 1 The Federal Reserve Board's national survey of small business financing is likely to 
be an important source of data. See Rebel A. Cole et a l. , Bank and Nonbank CompetitionjiJr 
Small Business Credit: lc'vidence from the 1987 and 1993 National Surveys of Small Business Fi-
nances, 82 F ED. REsERVE BuLL 983, 983-85 (1996). 
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having borrowed $100,000 (.8 x $125,000) secured by all its assets. 
Assume further that the evidence shows that lenders in this market 
segment determine the amount of credit they are willing to extend by 
reference to the value of the collateral. 42 Next, assume that, under 
normal credit policies that take into account the risks of loss under 
the existing full-priority regime, including the de facto partial subordi-
nation in bankruptcy, lenders have extended secured credit to the 
firms in the identified market segment in an amount equal to 80% of 
the value of the collateral. 4 3 Subordination rules increase the risk of 
loss to secured parties by allocating to competing creditors some or all 
of the collateral value. Thus, one would expect that under a subordi-
nation rule less secured credit would be extended. Assume that a 
given subordination rule, whose details for the most part need not 
concern us,44 decreases the value of collateral to secured lenders in 
the identified market segment to such an extent that they would be 
·willing to extend credit in an amount equal to 70% of the value of 
42 Th e use of loan-to-value ra tios appears widespread ·with respec t to bo th real prop-
erty and pe rsonal prope rty collateraL In some instances , statutes se t maximum loan-to-
value ra tios. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L'\WS ANN. ch. 175, § 63 (West 1 987) (generally limiting 
mortgage loans by insurance companies to 75% of the fair marke t value of the real prop-
ert:y securing the loan). In other credit markets, lenders set them. See, e. g. , PETER H. WEIL, 
AssET-BAsED LE!':DI!':G 237 (1 989) (describing the "borrowing base" fo r an inventory financ-
ing as "a percentage of the value of the inventory a t the lower of cost or marke t") . The 
Comptro lle r of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Deposit [nsurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision have adopted a uniform 
rule requ iring each supervised institution (national bank, state ban k member of the Fed-
e ral Rese rve System , insured state no nmember bank, o r savings association) to ad opt and 
maintain real-property lending policies tha t establish " [p] rudent unde n vriting standards , 
including loan-to-value limits." See 12 C.F.R. § 34.62 (b) (2) (ii) (1 997) (Comptroller); id. 
§ 208.52(b) (2) (ii) (Fed eral Reserve Board); id. § 365.2(b) (2) (ii) (Federal De posit Insur-
ance Corp. ); id. § 560.10l(b)(2)(ii) (Offi ce ofThrift Supervisio n ) . Inte ragency guidelines 
provide supervisory loan-to-value limits that an institutio n 's inte rnal limits sho uld no t ex-
ceed. See, e.g., Interage ncy Guidelines for Real Esta te Le nding Po licies, id. § 560.101 app. 
43 Bebchuk and Fried point to the fact that under current law (primarily Bankruptcy 
Code Chapte r ll) secured claims receive a de facto subordination (arising out of, fo r exam-
ple , d e lay, the automatic stay, unreasonably low colla te ral valuations, etc.). Bebchuk & 
Fried , sujJTa note 3, a t 911-13. But this shows only that the current o bstacles to e nfo rcing 
securi ty inte rests in bankruptcy have not entirely eli-rninated the utili ty of colla te ral, as in our 
example. On the other hand, if cu rrent law were to ex tend a more friendly hand to se-
cured claims in bankruptcy, then perhaps 85% or 90% financing, instead of 80%, might 
have been more appropria te in the example. 
4 4 O ne d e tail of the subordina tion n1le does concern us. Th e example assumes that, 
unde r the applicabl e rul e , a secured party may hold a fully secured claim in bankruptcy. 
For exam ple . the rule might permit holders of unsecured claims to take colla tera l fr ee of a 
security inte rest only to the extent necessary to provide them with a specified pro portion of 
the d ebtor 's assets. In contrast, the subordination rules that Bebchuk and Fried proffer 
preclude a creditor from eve r being fully secured in bankruptcy. !d. a t 905-11 (explaining 
the ex te nt to which a secured claim is treated as unsecured unde r the "adjustable-priority" 
and "fixed-fraction prio ri ty" rules). The adverse co nsequences of be ing undersecured in 
bankruptcy lead us to expect that a subordination rule taking the latter approach would 
result in an even greater contraction of credit than we hypothesize in our example . 
1360 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1349 
collateral. This suggests that each borrower would be likely to borrow 
$87,500 (.7 x $125,000), or $12,500 less than under the existing legal 
regime, and that, of the $100,000 ,000 in aggregate credit extended 
under the existing regime ($100,000/ borrower x 1000 borrowers), 
$12.5 million ($12,500/borrower x 1000 borrowers) would not be ex-
tended under the subordination rule. 45 Now assume that 2%, or 20, 
of the 1000 borrowers enter bankruptcy and that the collateral retains 
its original value, $125,000.4 6 Of this value, $37,500 ($125,000 -
$87,500) would be available for distribution to unsecured creditors. 
Of the $37,500, $25 ,000 would have been available under the existing 
regime and an additional $12,500 becomes available as a consequence 
of the subordination rule. Thus, under this scenario, aggregate se-
cured credit decreased by $12.5 million and the subordination rule 
put $250,000 ($12,500/ borrower x 20 bankrupt borrowers) in the 
pockets of the unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.47 The devil is in 
the numbers, of course, but resort to reliable data could inform the 
example. 
The contraction of secured credit in the example would not nec-
essarily result in the contraction of aggregate credit. For example, the 
increased debtor equity in collate ral and the operation of the subordi-
nation rule in bankruptcy might permit the debtors to offset the re-
duction in secured credit with unsecured credit. 48 We think it 
extremely unlikely that any increases in unsecured credit would offset 
4S In fact , the reduction in aggregate credit ex tended to the identified firms may be 
even greater. Some loans tha t might be made on the basis of an 80% loa n-to-value ra tio 
might not be made at all under a partial subordination regime. For exampl e, a firm might 
be unable to undertake a proj ect if it is able to borrow $70,000 rather than $80,000. One 
could not dete rmine from historical data alone h ow much less credit a le nde r would ex-
tend under a given subordination regime. It would be necessary to make estimates based 
not only on the da ta but also on the o pinions of credit analysts and ra ting agencies as to 
how a specified subordination regime would affe ct credit decisions. 
46 The assumption about collateral value probably is un realistic. Co nve ntional wis-
do m is tha t the actual collateral value rea lized in bankruptcy frequently is less than the 
prebankruptcy estimated value. This is one reason why lenders ofte n require a "cushion" 
of collateral value in excess of the secured debt. vVe m ake the assumption neverth eless in 
order to maximize th e amount that a pa rtial subordina tion rule would provide to un-
secured creditors, th e reby giving the bene fit of th e do ubt aga inst our hyp o theses. Mo re-
over, the fact that the value of a pa rticular item or group of collateral exceeds the secured 
debt is no t inconsiste nt with a d ebtor's insolvency or fi nancial di stress. 
47 More precisely, the subordination rul e put no more than $250,000 in the pocke ts of 
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. The additional amount unsecured credi to rs recover 
d epends on the amount of administra tive expenses and prio rity claims. See Bankruptcy 
Cod e § 726(a) , 1l U.S.C. § 726(a) (1 994). \:Ve be lieve tha t it is reason able to hypo th esize 
this disparity between the am o unt of credit contrac tion ($ 12.5 million ) and the increased 
recove ries by unsecured credi to rs ($250,000). The assumed lenders tha t re ly o n a loan-to-
value ratio are risk ave rse and would reduce c redit ex tensions by an amount greate r than 
that necessary to offse t precise ly their expected losses. 
48 A reduction in the appli cable inte rest rate tha t unsecured credito rs charge also 
might result. 
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a material portion of the reduction of secured credit. 49 Inasmuch as 
secured creditors in the example insisted on reducing the amount of 
available credit, such an increase in unsecured credit would occur 
only if the unsecured creditors were materially less risk averse than the 
secured creditors.50 
From the perspective of efficiency, one must be concerned not 
only about the reduction in the amount of available credit that would 
result from adoption of a subordination proposal, but also about the 
nature of the projects that firms will refrain from undertaking as a 
consequence of the reduction. Thus, Bebchuk and Fried pursue their 
subordination proposal even though they agree that it would prevent 
certain loan transactions, and thus certain projects, from going for-
ward. In part, they do so on the premise that subordination is "more 
likely to prevent the financing of an inefficient activity than an effi-
49 As the following letter from a Deputy Associate Attorney General demonstrates, 
interested segments of the United States federal government appear to share our intu-
itions on this subj ect. 
This letter responds to Professor Charles Mooney's request for com-
ments on a [subordination] proposal .... 
At the outset, we emphasize th at-perhaps uniquely-we appreciate 
the concerns the proposal seeks to address. The federal government is fre-
quently an involuntary, unsecured creditor as a result of its tax, environ-
mental clean-up, pension protection and other similar regulatory and 
enforcement responsibilities. The prospect of failing busin esses continuing 
to operate withou t the unencumbered resources necessary to comply with 
obligations imposed under the law threatens the effec tiveness of many im-
portant federal and state statutes designed to protect public health .... 
The proposed change to the Uniform Commercial Code thus responds 
to a serious problem that merits further study. Neve rthe less, after confer-
ring with numerous potentially affected federal agencies, we have con-
cluded that this proposal, though admittedly well intended, should not be 
adopted . . .. 
First, the effect of the proposal on the extension of credit n eeds fur-
ther study. The proposal could have detrimental effects on many highly 
leveraged sectors of the economy, such as small business and agriculture. 
Secured lenders ... might eithe r reduce lines of credit, demand greater 
security, exact higher rates of interest or impose a combination of a ll three. 
T o the exten t that lenders react by demanding greater collatera l, even 
more property of a borrower might become encumbered .... Ironically, 
unsecured creditors could be harmed to th e extent that businesses that 
could otherwise survive and generate profits with the help of secured credit 
are forced out of business or into bankruptcy. 
Th ese economic burdens would be imposed on all borrowers, not only 
those who present the types of risks that the proposal seeks to address. As a 
result, the proposal, if adopted, may well reduce the availability of p riyate 
credit to some sectors of the economy. 
Letter from Francis M. Allegra, Deputy Associate Attorney General , United States Depart-
ment of justice, to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director , The American Law Institu te 
(March 17, 1997) (on fil e with authors) (footnotes omitted). 
s o We realize, of course, that both the risk aversion and lending policies of creditors 
vary. See Mann, supra note 36 (manuscript a t 55-59) (arguing that differences in risk pref-
erences are the most plausible explanation for new lenders' willingness to extend credit to 
debtors whose existing lenders have decided to terminate the lending relationship). 
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cient one," and that their subordination scheme would prevent the 
financing of efficient activities only in "rather rare" situations.51 
It is instructive to see why Bebchuk and Fried think this might be 
true. Although their discussion,52 which centers around a numerical 
example, is far from clear, Bebchuk and Fried's argument appears to 
run as follows. They hypothesize that under a full priority regime for 
security interests, a particular firm can borrow $1,000,000, at an inter-
est cost of $80,000, in order to pursue a project with a "benefit to ... 
shareholders equal to $85,000."53 They also assume that the firm has 
nonadjusting creditors that (if they could) would charge a risk pre-
mium of $10,000 as compensation for additional risk. 54 Under a par-
tial priority regime, then, they assert that the prospective secured 
lender would charge interest of $90,000.55 They believe that the pro-
ject must be "inefficient," apparently because it would not be under-
taken if the firm were required to compensate all creditors with an 
appropriate risk premium.56 Consequently, they conclude that 
5 1 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, a t 918, 920. 
5 2 !d. at 917-21. Bebchuk and Fried's discussion of this example is not the centerpiece 
of their article. The discussion is, however, their principal consideration of the effects of 
their subordination proposals on investment and contraction of credit, the principal focus 
of this Article. 
53 Jd. at 918. The meaning of "benefit to shareholde rs" is unclear. Bebchuk and 
Fried assume that the shareholders will use a portion of this "benefit" to pay interest to the 
secured creditor. ld. at 918-19. Apparently, then, the term means the ne t expected value 
of the project before paying interest to the secured credito r (but after paying interest to 
the unsecured creditor). 
5 4 Id. a t 91 8. 
55 !d. 
56 ld. at 919. The example is troublesome in that the nonadjusting unsecured credi-
tor is the government. vVhy Bebchuk and Fried consider the government to be nonadjust-
in g is unclear, given the govern m ent's power to es tablish legal mles that adjust its risk as 
events transpire. For example, the government can enact a sta tute providing tha t every 
time a taxpayer grants a security interest, the governmen t au tomatica lly acquires a lien pari 
passu on the encumbered asset to secure tax obligations. The use of the government in 
this example is troublesome also because th e inefficiency turns on the notion that, were 
the government able to acljust to the finn's havi ng incurred secured debt, it would not 
have become a creditor unless it received a particular rate of return. But what is the appro-
priate rate of return for the governm ent? Finally, th e foresight Bebchuk and Fried attri-
bute to the firm in the example (the firm knows th at it will earn $85,000 if it borrows 
$ 1,000,000 to pursue a project and will decline the project if its in terest costs will exceed 
that amount) appears inconsistent with their (more pla usibl e) assumption elsewhere that a 
firm has no certain knowledge concerning the wealth consequences of its actions. ld. at 
894-95 (stating that a firm's commitmen t "not to ineffici en tly encumber [an] asset ... 
would require that the firm know in advance that it would be ineffici ent to en cumber 
particular asse ts"; it is a "reasonable assumption that it is difficult to acqui re this kn owledge 
in advance"). In Part II.B we develop our hypothesis that shifts in prio rity and liability 
rules like those in the subordination proposals are not likely to affect the behavior of 
debtors. 
! 
I 
l 
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projects that firms are likely to undertake under full priority, but not 
under partial priority, are inefficient.57 
The firm's nonadjusting creditors cannot possibly suffer any 
harm from the new secured credit unless the firm in fact becomes 
insolvent and fails to pay the creditors' claims in full. They may be 
exposed to additional risk, but that risk will be converted into harm 
only as to creditors of debtors that actually faiP 8 Indeed, firms that 
are not likely to fail (say, 95 %) and that do not actually fail (say, 98%) 
would be $5,000 richer if presented with Bebchuk and Fried's choices 
under full priority. Thus, those firms' nonadjusting creditors actually 
may benefit from the financing. 59 Furthermore, the creditors of the 
firms that are likely to fail (say, 5%) or that do fail (say, 2%) are pre-
cisely the creditors that may benefit the most and may have the least 
to lose from a full-priority rule. 
Bebchuk and Fried address only situations in which nonadjusting 
creditors would, if they could, extract a risk premium and in which, 
under partial priority, a secured creditor would remain willing to 
make a loan in the same amount, albeit with an additional risk pre-
mium. This incomplete vision fails to take account of many other situ-
ations, including those in which a secured creditor would refuse to 
57 In part because Bebchuk and Fried's example is so unclear, we do not explore its 
specif-lcs. However, Carlson analyzes the example under alternative assumptions and ar-
gues tha t, under e ither alternative, Bebchuk and Fried fail to draw appropriate conclusions 
from the numbers they posit. Carlson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 75-79). 
~s See Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSO PHICAL Fot:ND.·\TIO:-;s 
OF ToRT L\W 5 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (explaining that risk is n ot harmful in itself). 
The relevant risk and harm relate to nonpayment of claims. However, an awareness of the 
risk of nonpayment could poten tially impose some temporary disutility on a claimant that 
even tually is paid in full. 
59 See Harris & Mooney, sujJia note 2, at 2028-37; Schwarcz, supra note 3, passim. 
Bebchuk and Fried appear to believe, mistakenly, that the amount of risk premium that 
the creditors would have charged if they had been in a positio n to do so nevertheless harms 
the nonadjusting credito rs, who are in fact paid in full. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 
894 ("Since the involuntary creditors do not have the opportunity to se t the size of the ir 
claims to retl ec t the possibility [i.e., by charging a risk premium] of this $7500 transfer [of 
value to a secured creditor] , they would actually be ' hurt ' by the creation of th e security 
interest .... ") . Mo reover, as Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge, many creditors that they 
include in the class of nonruljusting creditors ac tua lly are acljusting, or at leas t impe,feclly 
acUustin g, creditors. For example, no one can doubt that when a government sets tax rates 
it takes into account the likely uncollectible po rtions of the taxes. Similarly, m any trade 
creditors with small claims take into account un collecti ble accounts in se tting the price and 
credit terms for th e ir products or se rvices. See id. at 894. They pro tect against loss by 
charging th e bad credit risks less and the good credit risks more than would be the case if 
they analyzed the credit risk of each customer. Contrary to Bebchuk and Fried's claims, id. 
at 894-95, these result-adjusting creditors are not disadvantaged when the ir debtors give 
securi ty. Th ere may be wealth transfers from the d ebtors with better credit (wh o may pay 
inappropriately high interest rates) to those with poorer credit (who pay inappropriately 
lmv rates ), but they do not necessarily refl ec t ex ante inefficienci es. Even "pure" tort credi-
tors may be positioned to take risk into account in some ways , for example, through deci-
sions about wh ich products to buy, which areas in which to jog, and which airlines to fly. 
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extend credit altogether or would offer to extend a smaller amount of 
credit under a subordination regime. Not only is their analysis incom-
plete, it is unsatisfactory even on its own terms. 
Bebchuk and Fried essentially propose to reduce risk by limiting 
the secured party's access to collateral in bankruptcy. 5° But if full pri-
ority in bankruptcy is wealth-enhancing, then adoption of their propo-
sal will reduce the social benefits. Bebchuk and Fried, like many 
before them, proceed on the assumption that externalization of risk is 
a priori to be avoided. 61 As Randal Picker has explained, however, 
whether externalizing risk is a good or bad thing is an empirical ques-
tion. 62 This is because the social benefits of a project include not only 
the return to the producer but also the consumer surplus a project 
creates, i.e., the aggregate amount by which the value of the project to 
consumers exceeds its cost to them. Unless legal rules designed to 
prevent externalization of risk take the consumer surplus into ac-
count, some activities having a positive net social value will not be un-
dertaken. As Picker explains: 
As soon as we abandon the assumption that [an entrepreneur] 
can capture all of the social benefit of her activities, we must also 
abandon our policy of full internalization .... Put differently, be-
cause some benefits from the project will almost necessarily be ex-
ternalized, we need to allow some risk to be externalized. 63 
Stated otherwise, complete internalization of risk-the premise un-
derlying Bebchuk and Fried's argument-has no necessary connec-
tion with wealth maximization. 
B. Effects of Full Priority for Secured Credit on Externalization 
of Risk and Debtor Behavior 
As we outlined in Part I, several subordination proponents have 
argued that affording full priority for security interests in bankruptcy 
leads to suboptimal, inefficient precautions against risk. 64 We hypoth-
esize that neither affording full priority to security interests nor mov-
ing to a subordination scheme has or would have a material effect on 
the level of risk and precaution that debtors undertake. The follow-
ing discussion explains our hypothesis and considers the prospects for 
acquiring empirical evidence to support it. 
60 Bebchuk & Fried, sujna note 3, at 859-67. The only way to eliminate the risk com-
ple tely wendel be to make all security interests ineffective. vVe know of no one who advo-
cates this approach. 
61 !d. at 863-66 & n.26. 
62 Randal C. Picker, Externalization 3 (Jan. 10, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with authors). 
63 !d. at 4. 
64 See supra Part I. 
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Leebron examines the effects of a firm's capital structure and the 
Bankruptcy Code's priority rules on the externalization of tort risk in 
a world of limited shareholder liability, as under current law. 6 5 H e 
offers three examples, each involving a biotechnology firm that holds 
assets of $100 million and faces a small risk that a catastrophic event 
will result in $200 million in tort liability. 6 6 H e first assumes that the 
firm's capital structure consists of $100 million in equity and no 
debt. 67 Inasmuch as the equity holders are at risk for no more than 
$100 million under a limited-liability regime, the firm has external-
ized $100 million of potential tort liability. 58 Leebron then posits that 
th e firm has only $50 million in equity and has borrowed $50 million 
from a financial creditor. 69 In this case, the $100 million in assets 
would be distributed pro rata to the holders of the $250 million of 
claims. 70 The tort claimants would receive $80 million, yielding a 
$120 million shortfall, and the financial creditor would receive $20 
million, yielding a $30 million shortfall. 71 Compared to the first ex-
ample, then, an additional $20 million of tort liability has been exter-
nalized. 72 Finally, Leebron varies the second example by assuming 
th at the $50 million of financial d ebt is fully secured.7 " Under tha t 
scenario, the financial d ebt would be paid in full, leaving $50 million 
of assets for the $200 million tort claimants and resulting in a $ 150 
million shortfall or $ 150 million of tort liability that h as been 
externalized. 74 
Leebron's observations are not unconventional in economic anal-
ysis. As the potential tort claims absorb more risk and the equity hold-
ers face less, the stakes shrink for the latter. This is said to reduce the 
d eterrent effects of tort liability and the precautions firms will take to 
avoid it. Apparently, Leebron thinks tha t the hypothetical debtor that 
acquires $50 million of secured debt instead of $50 million of equity 
65 Leebron , supra note 4, at 1636-49. Under a legal regime imposing unlimited share-
holder li abili ty, Leebro n obse rves that the bankruptcy priori ty rul es would be irrelevant, as 
the firms could n o t externalize tort risk unless the ir asse ts were insufficien t to sa tisf}• the 
claims. !d. a t 1637-38 & n .2 16. 
6 6 !d. at 1639. 
67 !d. 
6H See id. 
I)~) !d. 
70 See id. at I 639-40. 
7 1 See id. at 1640. Leebron apparently d oes no t d eem relevant th e fact th at until th e 
tort liability actually materializes, the contingent liability would no t be valued at $200 mil-
lion, but at a fractio n of tha t amount, represe ntin g the likelihood that the liability would 
accrue. 
72 See id. 
7 3 !d. 
74 See id. 
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will engage in behavior that is 50% more risky (the ratio of $150 of 
externalized risk to $100 of externalized risk) .75 
Leebron advances four reasons that support subordinating finan-
cial creditors (both secured and unsecured) to tort claimants: (i) fi-
nancial creditors can more easily diversify losses than tort creditors, 
(ii) decreasing the negative externality created by corporate limited 
liability will cause more efficient management decisions and "fewer 
unjustified tort risks," (iii) a subordination rule "would restore capital 
structure neutrality" for tort risks, and (iv) "creditors will have an in-
creased incentive to monitor corporate tort risks."7 6 We focus here on 
the second and fourth reasons, which together address incentives for 
firms to alter their behavior and take sufficient precautions against 
causing injury.77 Leebron concludes that modifying bankruptcy prior-
ity rules by subordinating financial claims, including secured claims, 
to tort claims would reduce tortious behavior as well as increase assets 
available to satisfy claims. 78 The additional assets would result from 
financial creditors' monitoring assets. 79 
Leebron's conclusions necessarily depend on an unstated as-
sumption that contemporary tort law has a deterrent effect on solvent 
firms with no financial creditors-those whose shareholders have the 
most at stake.8 0 But Leebron's assumption, which he leaves both un-
stated and unexamined, is problematic at best. Although no one 
7 5 vVould it follow tha t if Leebron 's hypo thetical debtor had only $5 million in equity 
and $5 million in debt, it would be ten times less careful than a d eb tor with $50 million in 
debt because it would have less to lose? Leebron does n ot explain whethe r h e is making 
o nly rel a tive comparisons, vi ewing externalized debt as it relates to total asse ts o r total 
equity. We also note in passing that Leebron 's hypothe tica l firms a re likely to diffe r mate-
rially in respects o ther than their capital structures. Reasons other than fortuity or whimsy 
likely are responsible for one finn having no debt and anoth er firm ha\ing debt equal to 
50% of its total assets. 
7 6 ld. at 1643. 
77 As for the first reason, we note only tha t adjusting the priority of claims against an 
insolvent debtor seems unlikely to be the most effective o r efficie nt method of spreading 
losses. 
7 8 Id. at 1643-50. 
79 See id. a t 1 G44-45. 
8 0 Leebron (as well as LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried, who followed h;m) fail ed to ex-
amine th e ope ration of and justifications for tort liability. An othe r advoca te of tort credi-
to r priori ty, however, has recognized that the prio rity d ebate cannot ignore the basis for 
to rt liability itself and the operation of the liability sys tem in practice . See Andrew Price, 
Note , Tort Creditor Su.j;etp riority and Other Proposed Solutions to Corporate Limited Liability and 
the Problem of h,\:ternalities, 2 CEo . .iYI.ASON L. REv. 439 ( 1995). 
This paper assumes that the Ame rican tort law system functions effi-
ciently. Therefore, this paper assumes that th e tort creditor problem poses 
a real problem which n eeds a solution beyond a change in the ton law 
sys tem. However, it is quite possible that the tort credito r problem onl y 
exists because of misince ntives in the American tort law system. In tha t 
case, it m ay be unreasonable to impose the costs of the fo!lm,ing proposal 
on the business community, when a less expensive solution may be fo und in 
to rt reform. 
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doubts that the potential for tort liability has some deterrent effects, 81 
the standard economic account of tort liability rules, based on exter-
nalization of risk and deterrence, has been roundly criticized and sub-
stantially discredited. Professor Stephen Sugarman's critique is 
particularly trenchant.82 Sugarman identifies two cognition-related 
weaknesses in the deterrence argument. He explains that many actors 
are uninformed of both the law (which will not surprise torts teach-
ers) as well as the facts necessary to apply it.83 As Sugarman points 
out, no one could really expect market actors to understand fully 
either the details of the liability rules or the particular kinds of behav-
ior that violate those rules. 84 Individuals-on their own account or as 
managers of firms-simply cannot determine with reasonable cer-
tainty whether particular conduct will create liability. Thus, not only 
do solvent firms commit torts, but in many cases, incurring the liabil-
ity is not in the interest of the tortfeasors. With hindsight, Ford might 
have been well advised to take additional precautions against danger-
ous gasoline tanks in Pintos. Taking additional precautions might 
have been in the best interests of Ford's management and sharehold-
ers alike. But how would Ford have been confident about the quan-
tum of risk or that a range of precautions would be either inadequate 
or excessive? Sugarman further explains that, even when individuals 
and organizations recognize and act upon a risk, often they are in-
competent to achieve success.85 He also rebuts the argument that un-
certainty itself necessarily leads to precaution. 
ld. at 440-41 (footnote omitted). Price recognized that before one can reach the point of 
actually advocating the subordination proposals to lawmakers, one first must defend suc-
cessfully the efficiency of the tort system. Having failed even to recognize this point, the 
subordination proposals obviously have not yet met this burden. 
81 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tmt Law: Does Tort Law Real(\' 
Deter~. 42 UClA L. REv. 377, 378, 390-423 (1994) (setting forth a moderate form of the 
deterrence arg·ument-tort law provides some meaningful deterrence, but much less than 
economists' formulae suggest). 
82 Sn:PHEN D. SucAR~1AN, DoiNG AwAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY L\w 3-24 (1989). 
Sugarman also critically examines the other commonly asserted accounts of tort law, prin-
cipally compensation-based and justice-based rationales. !d. at 35-49, 55-68. Sugarman is 
not alone in his skepticism about deterrence theory. See, e.g., lzHAK ENGL\RD, THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF ToRT LAW 43-44 (1993); John A. Siliciano, C01porate Behavior and the Social f<_jji-
cienry of Tort Law, 85 MrcH. L. REv. 1820, 1820-22 (1987). Skeptics of the efficiency of 
existing tort law as a deterrent are not limited to those writing outside the law-and-econom-
ics tradition. See, e.g., .Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in 
Tort l~aw, 87 CoLL"-"1. L. REv. 1385, 1392 ( 1987) (proposing a system of higher liabilit-y 
standards and higher penalties in order to accommodate errors by decisionmakers "in in-
terpreting the standard, or in resolving the factual issues," which, under current law, result 
in nonliability for some who fail to comply with the legal standard and liability for some 
who do comply). 
Sc> SuGARMAN, supra note 82, at 6-9. 
84 !d. 
S!'> !d. at 8-9. Sugarman also identifies other factors that undermine the deterrent 
effect of tort law: (i) the tendency to discount threats of liability, (ii) the high stakes of 
1368 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1349 
[F] or most potential defendants, liability insurance has largely 
vitiated this argument. Besides, many parti es will simply ignore the 
tiny possibility of a crushing financial loss in the way that people or 
companies ignore the chance that they might be killed or destroyed 
by an unexpected natural disaste r. Alternatively, if they dwell on 
this risk, people are apt to develop socially undesirable defense 
strategies or to exercise excessive caution and fail to engage in so-
cially beneficial activities. Finally, even if enterprises and individu-
als were to try to respond to an inde terminate likelihood of 
crushing liability, they would not know what amount of precaution 
to take.86 
In sum, n either firms nor the individuals who manage them are the 
fully informed, rational actors tha t Leebron would hope them to be. 
If the threat of liability under the rippled surface of law and fact 
generally serves as a poor (or, at best, a crude) deterrent, in part as a 
result of the cognitive issues that Sugarman advances, it follows that 
tinkering with the edges of bankruptcy priority rules could not possi-
bly provide an effective one. If a firm's m anagement cannot accu-
rately predict the results of taking or failing to take particular 
precautions, it is even more unlikely that management could create 
material reductions in risk by taking into account the amounts of the 
firm 's unsecured debts and secured debt as they relate to the firm's 
capital.87 And if management is not likely to react predictably and 
accurately to these marginal externalizations of risk, then the claim 
that monitoring by financial creditors will somehow play a meaningful 
role in direc ting behavior is virtually self-refuting.88 
po tentially dange rous activity, (iii) the like lihood that in fac t only a small penalty will be 
exac ted for tortio us behavio r, and (iv) the effect of liab ili ty iilSurance. !d. a t 9-1 8. 
Sfi !d. a t 8. Arguably, Leebron recognized that uncertainty might p lay a ro le in the 
analysis, but he did not consider it. Leebron, supra note 4, a t 1636 n .2 12 (acknowledging 
that his arti cle does not address the p ossible effects of fact-fin ding un certainty). 
87 See Schwartz, supra note 81, at 379 ("[L]egal econo mists [should] de-emphasize 
the ir efforts to fine-tune liability rules in order to achieve pe rfect d ete rrence. Given the 
imprecision in the processes by which to rt liability affects behavior, these efforts a t fine-
tuning, though inte ll ec tually cha llenging, a re likely to be socially irre levant. ") . Tha t tort 
law is such a blunt deterrent d oes not prove the desirabili ty of current law, which generally 
provides for full priority of security interests . However, it illustrates that any differen ces in 
de te rrence be tween current la\v and th e subordination pro posals would be trivial. \Ne re-
emphasize that we do not ques tion that m anagers of firms appreciate the potential fo r to rt 
li ab ili ty and take precautions based on tha t appreciation. v\'hat we ques tio n is the predic-
tion that the shifts in priority rules contempla ted by th e subordinatio n proposals wo uld 
ma terially affec t ac tual behavior. Although leverage, wh e ther secured or unsecured, m ay 
create an opportunity for managers to ex ternalize risk, we doubt tha t managers in fact 
could accurate ly calcula te, compare , and take account of these marginal ex terna li za tions 
of risks. 
SH We reserve for another day any comment on the asse t m onitoring that Leebron 
co ntemplates fina ncial creditors will provide under a subordination regime. vVe note , 
however, tha t anecdotal evidence suggests that, even under the curre nt full-pri ority re-
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We do not dispute that when equity holders, management, or fi-
n ancial creditors have much at stake, the level of precaution and mon-
itoring may be materially more significant than when they have little 
at stake. What we question, however, is whether variations in the pros-
pects that third parties will be required to absorb tort liability can be 
translated into reliable and predictable variations in behavior. ~9 Per-
haps Leebron, LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried should focus their con-
cerns on the continued operation of businesses whose owners and 
managers may have re latively little to lose, such as insolvent or n early 
insolvent firms. Professor Siliciano makes the point well: 
[T] ort reform holds limited potential for correc ting the problems 
caused by evasive beh avior. New rules generate new evasions. And 
although compliance may increase marginally with each expansion 
of liability rules, such improvements are likely to be offset, at least in 
part, by the decreased efficiency of transac tions designed to avoid 
the new rules . Moreover, even with global rules, tort 's basic m echa-
nism for controlling conduct-the threat of fu ture liability-is in-
herently limited. The effec tiveness of such a final threat ultima tely 
d epends on whether the ac tor has some thing to lose. But tort law is 
powerless to guarantee that actors will want to, or be able to, stay in 
business. Put more crudely, the law is powerless to ensure that all 
actors make enough money so that they are concerned about the 
prospect of losing it through liability judgments. Thus, even if tort 
law could proscribe all lesser evasions , it can do little to alter th e 
conduct of en terprises entering the final , natural refuge of 
insolve ncyY0 
We do not take lightly efforts to curb the problems associated \Vith the 
operation of undercapitalized and insolvent firms. Nevertheless, we 
suspect that it is extremely unlikely that adjustments in the priority 
rules for secured d eb t would provide an effective remedy for this 
gime, secured creditors are ha rdly indifferent abou t whe the r th eir debtors incur ton 
liability. 
89 \ 'l'e also question whe th e r inte rnali zing tort costs necessarily max imizes wealth. 
Traditional economic analyses, like those undertakt 1 by Leebron, supra note 4, LoPucki. 
supra note 2, and Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, propose to deter through tort law all 
conduct that causes a loss to victims that is greater than the costs of preventing or spread-
ing the loss. However, this analysis is deficient because it fai ls to take account of a ll th e 
soc ial benefits of the tortious con duct. See Picker, supra note 62, a t 3-6. 
90 Siliciano, supra note 82, at J 859 (footnote omitted) . LoPucki recently e laborated 
on the various means by wh ich judgment-proofing strategies can be achievedunde1· long-
standing legal principles. Lynn M. LoPucki , The Death of Liability, 106 Y ALE LJ. I , 14-38 
(1996). The issues of (1) whethe r Ame rican businesses have begun to utilize judgment-
proofing stra tegies with increasing frequency and (2) whe the r those businesses are likely to 
continue to use those strategies in the future has been the subject o f some debate. Compare 
id. (arguing that judgment-proofing has become increas ingly commonplace and is like ly to 
become even more so in the future) with ]amesJ. \Nhite, Ignoran t and Unasham ed (1997) 
(unpublished manuscript, on fi le with authors) (arguing tha t widespread judgmen t-proof-
ing by commercial firms is on ly theoretically possible). 
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problem. 91 A more likely candidate for reform is the most obvious 
source of responsibility for perpetuating insolvent firms' operations-
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Empirical testing of our hypotheses concerning the behavioral ef-
fects (or lack thereof) of both current law and a subordination regime 
will be enormously difficult.92 One initial approach that we intend to 
explore is the examination of relevant literature and data from the 
cognitive sciences, decision theory, and management studies. 93 In a 
recent paper, Cass Sunstein has made a compelling argument for fur-
ther behavioral research in the analysis of law, and in particular in the 
economic analysis of law.94 We also might consider a more forensic 
study of data concerning actual debtors that have and have not in-
curred material tort liability. At this point, we can note only our pessi-
mism about ascertaining likely behavioral effects of capital and debt 
structure from such data. We contrast this pessimism with our consid-
erably more optimistic views about demonstrating the likely effects of 
a subordination rule on the availability of credit. In addition to the 
availability of more accessible and relevant data, we expect to find that 
the bases for decisions concerning requests for extensions of credit 
from professional creditors are substantially more standardized, for-
m alized, and memorialized. 
9 1 Stated o the rwise, we hypothesize that the positive externaliti es that Leebron , 
Lo Pucki, Bebchuk, and Fried would expect from adopting a subordinatio n proposal would 
be minor. 
92 See Siliciano , supra note 82, at 1821-22. 
[The soc ial efficien cy] model of tort law posit-; th a t producers who might 
othe rwise face in ad equate incentives to act with care will , if saddled 
through li ability rules vvith the costs of injuries caused by defec tive prod-
ucts, seek to reduce such costs to optimal leve ls in order to remain 
competitive .... 
Indeed , the narco tic effect of th e social efficie ncy model of tort is so 
strong tha t one easily forget~ that it is simply a m od el, and on e that has 
never bee n empirically tested .... [T]he most comprehensive study of cor-
porate responses to to rt liability found that the ac tual operations of the tort 
system, ra th e r than e ncouraging producers to take o ptimal ca re, instead 
produced o nly an "indistinct signa l" la rgely devoid of useful guidance. 
!d. (footnotes omitted). The study that Professor Silician o relies upon is GEO RGE E .\ DS & 
P FT F.R REUTER, THE l!'ST. FOR C1v. JesT., D ES IGNI:-\C S A FE R PROlW CTS-CORPORr\TE RE-
S PO:-\S ES TO PRODU CT lL\B!LITY LAw AND REc u t.A Tro:--: (198:1) . Professor Silic iano obse rved 
tha t " [t]esting of the mode l may be impossible" and expressed doubt wh e ther "the e nd 
result of such effi ciency-e nhancing moves will be a system capable of optimizing product 
safeLy.'' Siliciano, sujJra note 82, at 1821 n .4 (citing Willi am M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ne r , A Positivf &anomie Analysis of Products L iability, 14 J. L EGAL STUD. 535, 551-53 ( 1985) 
(concluding that courts move from less effi cient to more efficient rules as circumstan ces 
di cta te) ) . 
~) 3 See AJbert v\'- Chau & J am es G. Phillips, l:Jfects of Perceived Control UjJon ·wagering and 
Attributions in Comfm!er Blackjack, 122 J. GEN . P s YC IIOL. 253 (1995 ) (comparing probabilistic 
and cognitive theories of risk-taking behavior). 
9 4 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Cr-11. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997). 
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CoNCLUSION 
We have sketched our hypotheses concerning tlvo significant as-
pects of proposals to subordinate secured claims to tort and other 
claims in bankruptcy: (i) the social costs of contraction of credit that 
might attend adoption of the subordination proposals, and (ii) the 
effects of adopting the subordination proposals on the externalization 
of risk and the (claimed) attendant increases in precaution. We also 
have outlined our current thinking about how to obtain empirical evi-
dence to test our hypotheses. Our reflections have taken the subordi-
nation proposals on their own terms, based on their stated goals of 
enhancing efficiency and maximizing wealth. But the empirical inves-
tigation that interests us may suggest other normative considerations 
that adoption of the subordination proposals would implicate. 
Consider the demographics of the group of debtors for which 
adoption of the subordination proposals would most likely cause re-
ductions in extensions of credit. For example, data may confirm that 
small businesses (and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses) would 
disproportionately comprise that group. 95 Many observers would see 
that fact as support for a normative case against the subordination 
proposals, even if the proposals were demonstrably sound on effi-
ciency grounds. Certainly those findings would explain the nearly 
universal lack of support for the subordination proposals in the cur-
rent revision of UCC Article 9. 
As a political matter, the subordination proposals have no realis-
tic prospects for widespread support and adoption. Entrepreneurship 
is an indelible feature of the American social fabric. Even assuming 
that hiking the price of admission to the business marketplace would 
promote efficiency, so that only those with substantial unleveraged 
capital could afford to participate (a dubious assumption), many-
perhaps most-would shrink from the prospect. In the end, the 
9.5 Conventional wisdom holds that smaller businesses are more likelv to obtain se-
cured credit than larger businesses. The resulL'i of the recently published survey, con-
ducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, bears this out. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(visited Sept. 24, 1997), <http:/ /www.bog.frb.fecl.us/boarddocs/smveys>. The size of a 
business bears a high correlation with the presence of collateral in f-Inancing the business, 
with smaller businesses more likely to give security. Telephone Interview with Rebel A. 
Cole, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 29, 1997). Minority owner-
ship of a business also correlates highly with size; minority businesses generally are smaller. 
!d. It is plausible to hypothesize that the reduction of credit following adoption of a subor-
dination scheme would fall disproportionately on businesses owned by women and mem-
bers of racial minorities. \Ne have not tested this hypothesis here, and the data do not 
necessarily prove this hypothesis. Our point is more basic. Proponents oflaw reforms that, 
if adopted, would reduce available credit should take into account the likely victims of the 
reductions. vVe do not claim here , however, that current law is necessarily the optimal 
means of supporting small businesses. 
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needs and aspirations of the market participants-from the small 
businesses on Main Street to the economic engines on Wall Street-
will prevail. 96 
96 Any serious approach to Jaw reform, as opposed to scholarship for its sake alone, 
cannot ignore the political landscape. See Eric A. Posner, The Pohlica.l Economy of the Bank-
mptcy Reform Ar:t of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REv. 47 ( 1997) (analyzing the legislative and intellec-
tual history of the Act from a public choice perspective); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theary of 
American CorjJomte Finance, 91 CoL.UM. L. REv. 10 (1991) (observing that American corpo-
rate ownership and management can be explained only by understanding prevailing polit-
ical influences, such as concerns about permitting financi al institutions to invest in and 
control industrial firms). Well intentioned as they may be, the subordination proposals are 
widely seen as a broadside assault on small business. See, e.g., Letter from Francis M. Al-
legra to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., supra note 49. We suspect that the data will bear this out. 
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